

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

UKRAINIAN SECURITY POLICY

by

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ABSTRACT

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The 20th century culminated with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the formation of New Independent States in post-Soviet Eurasia, and a continuing process of NATO enlargement. Ukraine has been in the center of these events. Since 1991, it has endeavored to bring its own contributions to the preservation of peace and stability in Europe and globally. Ukraine is actively seeking membership in European and Euro-Atlantic structures, but is constrained by national and regional features that limit her strategic goals. This research project addresses issues such as: (1) Ukraine's actions for improving its position in the regional and global security arena; (2) how the regional security dynamics will be affected as Ukraine attempts to join NATO in the near future; (3) how Ukraine will safeguard its national security by not being a NATO member and what will be the associated risks. All of these issues have a great importance, not only for Ukraine, but for the future of Europe and the world. These are the issues that are addressed in the present research project. The main goal of this study is to analyze the domestic and external environments that affect Ukrainian national security strategy, develop scenarios for Ukraine's future in light of new global challenges and threats, and provide recommendations for what Ukraine can do in order to achieve a stronger national security posture and be better prepared for coping with new symmetric and asymmetric threats.

UKRAINIAN SECURITY POLICY

The 20th Century culminated with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and disintegration of the Soviet Union. The emergence of new independent states in post-Soviet Eurasia radically changed the political situation and the force allocation in the Central and Eastern European region as a whole. Being at the crossroads East and West, Ukraine has realized its key role in keeping peace and stability within the region and from the first days of its independence has pursued a peaceful domestic as well as foreign policy.

During its fourteen years of sovereignty, in spite of hardship and a number of obstacles, Ukraine was able to create the durable foundations of a state system, and turn into a competent member of European and global society. Through membership in regional and global security institutions and vigorous participation in crisis response, humanitarian, and joint peacekeeping operations Ukraine has played a vital role in the preservation of peace and stability in Europe, as well as around the globe. A West-oriented national policy addressed various issues of democratic transformation in all areas of society and in state institutions, but was limited in scope and activities until the presidential elections of 2004.

The “Orange Revolution”, which was sparked by protest against mass gerrymandering and fraudulent elections, consolidated Ukrainian society around national values and beliefs, and demonstrated its loyalty to a democratic path of social and economic reform. For the first time since the country’s independence, Ukrainians presented themselves to the global society not just as citizens, but as a nation. Ukraine soundly proclaimed its adherence to democratic values and freedoms, and its course toward full-scale integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

However, the further advance of democratic reforms and economic transformation, realization of European intentions, and full-scale integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions and structures, including security structures , is impossible without a clear strategic vision of the nation’s role and position in the contemporary world. Ukraine needs an overall strategy with a long-term perspective, such as that provided in a number of developed countries by the national security strategy.

Ukrainian National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine

Ukraine's history of foreign domination, colonial servitude and divided rule has left deep scars on the national psyche. It has left the new state woefully unprepared to define its national ideals and objectives in a brave new world. The country's leadership, Ukraine's legacy from the Soviet Union, was more interested in pursuing and preserving selfish commercial/financial interests than it is in defining and securing Ukraine's strategic interests and in building a prosperous, democratic nation for the benefit of present and future generations.¹

The Ukrainian National Security Strategy does not exist as a formal strategy document, and, thus, might be seen as a compilation of different constitutional declarations and national laws that determines a strategic course of action. Some scholars argue that a country's National Security Strategy is identified through the national ideas that express the collective will of its citizens. The Strategy serves for such nations as a vision of achieving a desirable future. After the "Orange Revolution", when the course on further democratic reforms, economic transformation, and accession to the European Union and NATO structures was proclaimed, Ukraine confronts the necessity of developing such an overarching strategy.

For a better understanding of the evolution of the Ukrainian National Security Strategy one has to comprehend some of the national characteristics of Ukraine and the historical roots of the Ukrainian foreign policy that was pursued over the last decade. One can argue that fourteen years of independence is a very short period of time in the span of history, but in the contemporary world, when rapid globalization processes act as a catalyst, such a stretch of time is quite sufficient for analyzing the historical trail of the new Ukraine. The evolution of the Ukrainian National Security Strategy might be conditionally divided into three main phases: a foundational period, the period of mistakes and miscalculations, and the consolidation period.

The foundational period started after Ukraine achieved independence and lasted till the end of 1997. It is the period when national attributes were introduced and major state institutions, such as the Parliament, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense were created. It is also the period of the ratification of a new Ukrainian Constitution and balancing functions and responsibilities between the state's powers – executive, legislative, and judicial. Official diplomatic relations with different countries were established during the first six years of independence, while Ukraine demonstrated its active engagement in European and global security institutions and organizations.² The first National Security Concept was designed in 1997 and identified "the strengthening of civil society" as the main task of National Security Policy. In other words this period might be called a period of state-building.

The period of mistakes and miscalculations was mainly the result of a multi-vectorial foreign policy pursued in the late 1990's. The goal was to expand relations with Europe, while keeping relations with Moscow stable, and continuing to build a strategic partnership with the United States. This policy was the result of a combination of different internal, as well as external factors, and reflected the main trends of the post-bipolar world in Central-Eastern Europe. The policy was driven by a strong dependence on cheap energy resources, primarily oil and gas, restructuring of economic relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, and a huge interdependence between Ukrainian and the post-Soviet industrial complexes. At the same time the nation had a strong "European-oriented nation-building"³ process, and continued to construct partnership relations with European countries and the U.S. This period might be described as a time of increasing corruption, including the appearance of Ukrainian oligarchs, improper if not outright illegal mixing of governmental executive and legislative functions with economic activities, and a background of poor strategic leadership and lack of political will to move forward on democratic reforms in all sectors of the state. In other words it was the period of sound proclamations, while simultaneously marching in place and not moving ahead.

The consolidation period started with a vital decision by the National Security and Defense Council of May 23, 2002 "The Strategy on Ukraine's Relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)". The decision states that joining NATO, which is the basis of the pan-European security system, is the final national goal of the security policy of Ukraine. Other important documents that reflected a natural national tendency to the West were ratified during this period. Essential changes were also made in the Ukrainian Military Doctrine. But, in spite of all these political and legislative steps the main course of the Ukrainian foreign policy was not so consistent until the last presidential elections. Then an official course of further democratic reforms and the full-scale integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures was soundly announced by the President and approved by the Parliament of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian National Security Strategy

The main pillars of the Ukrainian Security Strategy are currently presented in the Ukrainian Constitution and other official documents. The Strategy that is coordinated by goals, tasks, conditions, and means is a *long-term complex program of practical steps for guaranteeing the security and protection of vital national interests* from external and internal threats. It is the foundation for a complex strategic planning for different state institutions of power in the sphere of national defense and security.⁴

The Strategy has a defensive character and is based on nonintervention, respect for the national borders and independence of other states, and rejection of the use of force as an instrument of policy. Because of political sensitivity the Strategy avoids identifying a specific threat. Rather it refers to a “state whose consistent policy presents a military threat... [or] leads to interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine, or encroaches on its territorial integrity and its national interests.”⁵ As was mentioned above the Strategy, approved by the Ukrainian Security and Defense Council, fosters Ukraine’s relationship with NATO and lays down the final aim of Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance. This signifies Ukraine’s departure from its earlier declared neutrality, which has no further usefulness for the state.

The National Security Strategy is based on a system of national values and beliefs that are universal guidelines for building a democratic state, civil society, and a social-oriented market economy. In a Presidential address to the Ukrainian Parliament the national values were specified as statehood, the well being of the people, national security, a European orientation, devotion to human values, and respecting and safeguarding basic human and liberty rights of the people.⁶

In July 22, 2003 the Parliament of the Ukraine passed the Law of Ukraine “*On the Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine*” that determined modern foundations for state policy. The Law provided direction on the protection of national interests, and guarantees of national security and progressive development within Ukraine. According to the Law the National Security Strategy, which is approved by the President of Ukraine, provides foundations for the state’s strategic programming and its execution is the obligation of all state agencies. It defines the fundamentals of state policy aimed at protection of national interests and guarantees in Ukraine the safety of the individual, and the security of society and the state from external and internal threats in all spheres of social activity.

The Law identifies the objects of national security: an individual and a citizen - their constitutional rights and freedoms; the society - its spiritual, moral, ethic, cultural, historical, intellectual and material values, informational medium and environment, as well as natural resources; and the state - its constitutional order, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability. The Law provides for a balance between the principles governing the interests of the state and the protections afforded for individual human rights.

The priorities of Ukraine’s national interests described in the Law include the following: guaranteeing of constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen; development of civil society and its democratic institutions; protection of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of states frontiers , non-interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine; strengthening of

political and social stability in the society; and ensuring the development and functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language in all spheres of public life in the territory of Ukraine.

The Law contains a list of real and potential threats to the national interests and national security of Ukraine, and explains the basic directions of state policy. The list is based on an analysis of the main factors that might cause the emergence of potential threats to national security, particularly in the political and economic areas. These factors mainly focus on threats coming from destabilizing social-political processes, intensified national and religious tensions, separatist intentions in some regions and among some groups of people (clearly shown during the presidential elections in 2004), distrust in the efficient operation of the government authority, emigration of qualified labor force, etc.⁷ The state policy is aimed at minimization of these negative factors in the spheres of external policy, state security, military and border security of the State of Ukraine, internal policy, economy, social and humanitarian areas, science and technology, ecology, and information.

The Law contains the main directions of national policy and entails ten major goals and 60 directives or tasks for its achievement. Goals mainly reflect the achievement of national interests and tasks specified in different areas such as foreign policy, state security, internal policy, economic policy, etc. The main goal of foreign policy is specified as the active engagement in the international policy process, and a new importance is addressed to issues of gaining membership in NATO and the EU. The Law promotes: "Ensuring security by Ukraine gaining membership in the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." A number of missions are aimed at internal democratic transformations, participation in international peacekeeping activity, fighting international terrorism, organized crime, and WMD proliferation.

Provisions of the Law describe the authority and basic functions of the President of Ukraine, the Parliament of Ukraine, the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; the National Bank of Ukraine; the ministries, the Security Service of Ukraine; the local state administrations and bodies of local self-government. They are aimed at ensuring national security. The control over implementation of measures in the sphere of national security is to be performed respectively by the President of Ukraine, the Parliament of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine within the limits of their authorities prescribed by the Constitution and laws.

Overall the Law gives the impression of "institutional thinking"⁸ and a collective approach to its development. It has shown a significant improvement in comparison to its predecessor - the Law 1997- but still contains some gaps and imperfections. National priorities entailed in the

Law are addressed too broadly and without proper specification. The Law "...does not provide a clear and concise statement of what threatens Ukraine and how to meet these threats."⁹ Instead, 68 declarative threats to national security and social stability are presented under several headings in an apparently random sequence. Consequently it creates ambiguity and difficulty in understanding what the primary concern of the nation is . Sherr states that "... [a]bsent a clear statement of what is urgent and what is possible, the law is more likely stimulate talk than effort."¹⁰

However this "...document is very general in tone and reflects the continuing ambiguities present in defining Ukraine's security interests, threats, and policy objectives..."¹¹ resulting in an absence of clearly defined goals, a poor threat prioritization, an overall declarative ambiguity, and very broad recommendations for achieving national goals. Nevertheless, the Law itself presents a significant step in the national security planning process. A solid part in the Law is devoted to the protection of human rights and basic freedoms of individuals and citizen. For the first time on the legislative level, Euro-Atlantic integration is declared as a key factor of national security.¹² The Law addresses the threats of terrorism and proliferation of WMD, and talks about energy security and the diversification of energy supplies.

The Military Doctrine

The Military Doctrine is a core document that addresses issues of the National Security Strategy in the field of national defense and application of military power. The Doctrine is an aggregate of guiding principles, military-political, -strategic, -economic, and - technical estimations on guaranteeing the military security of Ukraine. It serves as a basis for decision making processes that have a long-term application in the military-political and military-strategic spheres and for programs development and implementation in the military sphere.

The new Doctrine was ratified in June 2004 and revised in accordance with the new strategic goal – full membership in NATO – in April 2005. The Doctrine has a defensive character and

...reemphasizes a statutory and political commitment to a non-nuclear status. It stresses the principle of "reasonable defense sufficiency" in determining the number and types of forces as well as the quantity and quality of conventional weapons. It puts a priority on developing modern, well-trained, and highly mobile forces with emphasis on precision weaponry, intelligence and electronic warfare, air and space defense, and airpower and seapower. To accomplish these objectives, this doctrine calls for a modern and economically rational defense industrial base.¹³

The Doctrine focuses on the prevention and neutralization of real and potential threats to the national security of Ukraine in the military sphere. According to the Doctrine the main goal of the military security of the state is *elimination* of external and internal threats to the national security of Ukraine and *creating favorable conditions* for a guaranteed defense of national interests. It lists real external threats to the national security of Ukraine in the military sphere such as proliferation of WMD and means of their delivery, military-political instability and conflicts in neighboring countries, international terrorism, illegal weapons and explosive devices trafficking, the building up of units and armaments near the Ukrainian borders, and the incompleteness of legislation related to demarcation of Ukrainian borders. The main internal threats in the military sphere are unlawful activities by extremist, separatist, and radical religious organizations, and attempts to create terrorist or unlawful armed groups . According to Sherr the Doctrine does not properly concentrate on 'classical military threats' diminution of which does not eliminate all military danger.¹⁴

The Doctrine determines the main conditions for guaranteeing a stable military security situation. They are "...strengthening trust between states, a gradual decreasing of the threat of using military force, conducting the Euro-Atlantic integration policy, and reinforcement of cooperation with global, European and regional structures of collective security." It states that intensified relations between Ukraine and NATO are the main precondition of guaranteeing security and stability in Europe. The acceleration of Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic integration, by means of a deep reformation of the national defense sector according to European standards, therefore is a chief priority of national external and internal policy.

The Doctrine determines main elements of guaranteeing the national security of Ukraine in the military sphere in peacetime, before aggression, during conflict, and after repelling aggression. It entails the tasks and responsibilities of the Armed Forces and other military formations and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine, such as Internal Troops or Militia. It binds together all elements of military power and places them under unilateral operational planning, execution, command and control. The Doctrine concludes that the Armed Forces (means) have to have three main functional components – the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, Main Defense Forces, and Strategic reserves in order to deter and neutralize threats to national security. It lays down tasks for the Armed Forces and other military formations in peacetime, on the eve of the adversary aggression, and during war. It also sets main forms and ways for using military force.

A special section of the Doctrine defines goals, principles, and ways for the economic and technical development of the Armed Forces. It addresses the development of the military-

industrial complex and the ‘professionalization’ of the UAF, but according to Sherr it presents ‘two points of skepticism’ since both goals require considerable resources and funding, which currently only the U.S. can afford.¹⁵

The Doctrine particularly focuses on main elements of the military security of Ukraine—adherence to the legislation and fulfillment of international agreements about temporary basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory, introduction of the system of democratic civil control over the military organization of the state and law enforcement agencies, development of military-political partnership and cooperation with NATO and the EU and active participation in international peacekeeping activities. The Doctrine emphasizes that the strengthening of strategic stability in the Central and Eastern European region and achieving interoperability according to the NATO standards are main preconditions for guaranteeing the military security of Ukraine. The new Doctrine revises the conceptual approaches to integration into European and Euro-Atlantic security structures by acquiring full-scale membership in NATO and the EU.

Regional and Sub-regional Security Cooperation

Ukraine's Relations with Russia

Ukraine and Russia are not just close neighbors but countries that share a thousand-year-old history. The Kievan Rus, the first Slavic state, gave birth to the Russian and Ukrainian nations in the 13th Century. Geographically, Russians settled around Moscow and Novgorod while Ukrainians remained on their historical land. Both nations suffered from the Tatar-Mongol invasion and survived almost a century of domination by the Golden Horde. In the 14th Century the Grand Duchy of Lithuania overthrew a weakened Mongolian regime, and soon after, together with Poland, established the “Rzech Pospolita” – the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which took under its control the biggest part of Ukraine. A Cossack freedom movement expelled foreigners from ancestral lands and focused on the issue of national liberation in the 17th Century. A new Ukrainian state—the Cossack Hetmanate—was too weak to defend itself and eventually asked the Russian Tsar to establish a protectorate. A treaty between the two nations called for equal status relations and the right of self-governance. Ukraine managed to survive for barely a century under the Muscovite regime. However, Catherine the Great (1762-1796) destroyed the foundations of Ukrainian sovereignty and evicted the Cossacks from its soil. Consequently, Ukraine became a part of a huge Russian Empire. During the 18th and 19th Centuries Ukrainians lived under the domination of Imperial Russia. The Ukrainian language as a language of a ‘second class’ Slavic nation was forbidden in official government

communications and in literature. Rebellions drawing on national ideas were severely suppressed, and the Ukrainian intelligentsia was severely persecuted. Ukraine enjoyed a short period of independence in 1917-1919 after the October Revolution, but soon became subjugated by Communist Russia. In 1932-1933 Ukraine underwent *holodomor* – a mass famine artificially created by imposed unrealistically high quotas on grain production that was turned over to the central Soviet state. Although Ukrainian grain and other agricultural production accounted for 27% of the Soviet Union harvest, Ukraine was forced to become responsible for 38% of the overall production. The Soviet state also implemented *kollektivizatsia* – the forcible collectivization of private farms. Approximately seven to ten million¹⁶ innocent victims died from starvation during this period. It is estimated that another ten million Ukrainians died during 1939-1945 because of Stalin's continuous massive political repression and because of the German invasion and military occupation in WW II. The Ukrainian struggle for the Allied victory under the banner of the U.S.S.R. in the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War and the Nazi occupation slave labor *OstArbeiter* ("worker from the East") program greatly contributed to this death toll. Immediately after the failed 'coup d'état' in Moscow in August 1991 Ukraine proclaimed its independence.

Ukraine inherited from the USSR massive armed forces with no operational elements of command and control, odd parts of an industrial complex that were mainly dependent on Russian energy supplies, a weak structure of state power, economic debts , *the nomenklatura* - a ruling communist strata of society with a Soviet mindset, deep bureaucratic and a tradition of venality. Ukrainian independence, as with Georgian, Moldovan or other post-Soviets states, is 'a fait accompli', but it is rather unacceptable for Moscow's political elite, which is challenged to become accustomed to this idea. Moreover, it had been completely incompatible with Russian plans for domination in the post-Soviet space. Russia has continued to treat these new states as its vassals, and perceives their independent status as a 'misapprehension'. A 'near abroad' term was coined to indicate areas occupied by these states and designate the boundaries of a desired sphere of a Russian influence, basically identical to the geographical space of the former USSR.

Taking into account Ukraine's geopolitical situation in Europe and the close historical connection between the two states , Russia is clearly the most important strategic partner of Ukraine, first of all in the economic and energy supply areas. Russia plays an important role in the security sector of the whole Eurasian arena. Ukrainian foreign policy toward Russia is based upon open, equal, and constructive relations, and defined by *the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation* between the two states. However, the foreign policies of both states are materially

different. When Ukraine pursues a West-oriented policy and has a favorable attitude to the EU and NATO enlargement, Russia perceives this as a threat to its security and as an infringement on to its sphere of influence. While Ukraine became a member of the Confederation of Independent States (CIS) in December 1991, in January 1993 it refused to endorse a draft charter strengthening political, economic, and defense ties among CIS members. Ukraine has also ignored an idea to create a “fraternity of Slavic states” – Slavic Union. All these factors noticeably effect formal relations between states that have been overburdened by unsolved problem connected to the allocation and basing of the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet, energy supply, and border demarcation issues.

During 1995 and 1998 Ukraine and Russia signed a series of agreements on the final division and disposition of the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet that have helped to reduce tensions over the Crimea and the status of Sevastopol. According to the Agreement, the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation has a right to be temporarily stationed on Ukrainian territory until 2017. But, prior to the expiration date some issues have to be resolved, including an agreement on the status of Russian forces on Ukrainian territory (such as SOFA), control over a Black Sea Fleet armament, transferal of navigational functions and means, such as lighthouses to the Ukrainian Naval Forces, and environmental security.

Russia recognized Ukrainian sovereignty in 1998 after seven years of bilateral quarrels. In spite of signing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Russia continues to pose demands over a border demarcation issue in the Kerch Strait. In September-October 2003 relations were complicated again over the ownership of the tiny Tuzla Island, when Russia started to build a dam from its western Azov Sea coast toward the island that serves as a Ukrainian outpost in the Kerch Strait. Russia insisted upon drawing a demarcation line on the seabed of the Azov Sea, and having equal control rights over the eastern channel – the major source of fishing and only pass from the Black Sea to Azov Sea – between the Ukrainian coast and Tuzla Island. Ukraine preferred to have the border drawn over the water in accordance with international law, and for the Russian merchant fleet to pay Ukraine for using the channel. In spite of the fact that roughly 95 percent of the documents on border issues had been signed by the end of 2005, a border negotiation process is still going on and the issue remains open.

Ukrainian dependence on Russian energy recourses (Ukraine annually imports about 61 percent of crude oil and 39 percent of its natural gas from Russia¹⁷) is another issue area that needs to be addressed. The inability to pay a full market price for natural gas imports and accumulated debts unbalance mutual relations and create an opportunity for Russia to influence Ukrainian foreign policy. During the last decade Ukraine has been shocked several times by oil

and gas crises, for example the ‘Massandra incident’ of 1992, the gas crises in September 1993 and two years later in November 1995, the oil crisis in December 1999 – January 2000,¹⁸ and the crisis in November 2001. At the end of 2005 a new crisis was unfolding. Russia unilaterally prepared the draft of a new energy agreement despite the fact that the currently operative agreement remains in force until 2009. Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas supply monopoly, insists that Ukraine pay the ‘European market price’ for natural gas deliveries and would like to raise the price to \$220-\$230 for 1,000 cubic meters (m^3 – approximately 22,188 cubic feet or ft^3 ; the equivalent U.S. price would be \$0.00992-\$0.01037 per million ft^3 or per mcf) of natural gas beginning in 2006 (currently Ukraine pays \$50/ m^3 or \$0.00225/mcf).¹⁹ During the first three days of 2006 Russia stopped the import of natural gas to Ukraine, pressing Ukraine to consent to a new price of natural gas. In spite of this, Ukraine continued to take natural gas in accordance with the bilateral agreement, but finally Kyiv agreed on an average price \$95/ m^3 for mixed Russian and Central Asia natural gas. In accordance with the agreement, which was signed on January 31, 2006 the company RosUkrEnergo is the sole supplier of natural gas to Ukraine. While 50 percent of this Company’s stock shares are owned by the Russian state-owned company Gazprom, the other 50 percent belongs to unknown shareholders represented by the Austrian Raiffeisen Investment group.²⁰ The lack of ownership transparency of RosUkrEnergo (e.g., its long-term financial viability) may create future issues that can negatively affect ownership and control over the Ukrainian gas-transport system. Approximately 80 percent of all Russian gas exports to Europe transit through this gas-transport system. This is one objective of Russian policy. The second objective is to show the “urbi et orbi” weakness of the “Orange regime” on the eve of the Ukrainian parliamentary elections.²¹

It is beyond doubt that Russia utilizes its energy supplies for the purposes of political leverage. Gazprom’s proposed dramatic increases for its exported natural gas threaten not only Ukraine’s well being and economic viability, but also the economic viability of Poland and other European countries. Russia’s willingness to use its energy exports as a political weapon is evidenced by the fact that countries which continue to be aligned with Russia’s sphere of influence receive gas supplies at preferential prices that are not “market-driven.” For example, Belarus will continue to receive natural gas at \$46 per 1,000 m^3 (\$0.00207/mcf), while both Armenia and Transnistrian-Moldovan Republic will also benefit from such lower prices.²² In addition, Russia is reducing its dependence on “former Soviet client states” for the transit of its energy exports by constructing pipelines that will bypass countries such as Ukraine and Poland. For example, in September 2005 Russia and Germany signed a \$5 billion agreement for the construction of a 720-mile (1,098 km) natural gas pipeline that will be routed under the Baltic

Sea and will connect the two countries. This pipeline is likely to cut off both Poland and the Ukraine from emerging energy transportation markets.

Although Russia may be pursuing its own political influence goals in the aftermath of the Ukrainian “Orange Revolution,” this is not a legitimate way of unilaterally changing complex and interlinked bilateral energy trade agreements. Obviously, the rise of the global prices for energy recourses should be accordingly reflected in the formulation of the gas price for all Russian recipient countries and not only for the ones that are non-loyal to the Kremlin. The process of prices formulation should be done on a basis of negotiation and without economic blackmail and political arm-twisting. Ukraine, in turn, in order to reduce its dependence on energy imports from largely a single supplier, should incorporate a set of different contingency measures in its National Security Strategy in the form of diversification of energy supplies, development of alternate energy sources and energy-saving technologies, conservation and the creation of strategic energy stocks, and the exploration and development of new energy sources.

Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-CIS military cooperation has been rather modest in comparison to that with NATO and the U.S. Military cooperation with Russia and the CIS includes collaboration in the field of the Joint Air Defense System, common procedures of navigation and cooperation in the Black Sea, cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and participation in multinational exercises such as “Azov-Antiterror”. Ukraine and Russia host about 50 events annually. In comparison, the U.S.-Ukraine bilateral cooperation program includes roughly 150 activities per year. Ukraine did not join the Collective Security Treaty (CST), and maintains observer status in the Committee of Chiefs of Staff of the CIS. K. Morozov argues that it is not difficult for Ukraine to become a member of CST, since membership accession procedures are very simple, customary, and rooted on old ideological principles. Membership in the CST does not require serious preparation activities or adherence to strict democratic principles. The “as is” status of Ukraine is more then acceptable for this organization.²³ But it does not correspond with Ukrainian policy, which prefers a democratic way of development as an inevitable component of achieving true freedom, stability, and prosperity.

The cooperation in the military-industrial area between Ukraine and Russia was impressive in the early 1990s and embraced a lot of joint projects in the space and aerospace industries, in armament development, etc. But due to financial constraints, competition over available markets, and different political courses it began to fade away. Numerous bilateral agreements and projects were postponed from year to year, and mostly not implemented, e.g. the Antonov An-70 and An-140 transport aircraft projects. At the same time, the Ukrainian

reliance on Russian supplies in some projects is about 72 percent, e.g. the Ukrainian launch vehicle ‘Zenith’, and the portion of Russian bookings from all Ukrainian foreign orders is about 67 percent, while the Russian industrial complex is underutilized by 70 percent.²⁴ All these factors force Russia to move away from cooperation with Ukraine and to develop alternative capabilities. Russia prefers to cooperate with China, India or France (e.g. development of the launch vehicle ‘Soyuz’ for the ‘Soyuz-Kuru’ project, or the training planes MiG-AT) who could invest hard Western currencies in the development of the Russian military-industrial complex. Recent statements by Russian politicians about terminating the Ukrainian-Russian military-technical cooperation, because of Ukrainian aspirations toward NATO, demonstrate Russia’s priorities and strain relations with Ukraine even further. But, a solution for Ukraine may be found in an initiation of military-technical cooperation and joint projects with NATO, and joint cooperation in space programs with the U.S.

The end of the Kuchma regime – loyal to Kremlin and ambivalent with the West – marked the end of post-Soviet foreign policy between Ukraine and Russia that was based on backstage understandings and the lack of diplomacy through formal agreements. The absence of common strategic goals and differences in policy require rethinking and restructuring of these bilateral relations.²⁵ Certain divisive issues may be diminished, if not eliminated altogether, through their incorporation into governmental agendas for deliberation and negotiation. Fostering close economic cooperation between states in trade and production, cooperation in heavy industrial and science intensive areas can positively affect the development of constructive, good-neighboring relations. Ukraine’s economic and energy dependence on Russia may be gradually reduced by pursuing a deliberate, long-term and national-oriented strategy. While Ukrainian aspirations toward NATO and EU membership are considered by Russia as “infringement on its vital strategic interests” Ukraine has to openly and convincingly demonstrate that its course toward Western institutions has historical roots, based on national values, and reflects national will. Ukraine’s membership in these organizations will cement and stabilize the security situation in the Eurasian region. Good and constrictive relations between two countries are very important for Europe as well, and might serve as a bridge between the EU and Russia, between West and East. It is vital to stress this issue in the National Security Strategy and implement it in practical steps.

Ukraine’s Relations with Poland, Moldova, Romania, and the Baltic States

Poland is a close neighbor of Ukraine, not just in geographical terms, but also in the historical context. The history of modern Ukrainian-Polish relations started on December 2,

1991 when Poland, first among all other countries, recognized Ukrainian independence. The relations between the two countries are based on principles of good-neighborliness, equality, and true friendship. Over the last decade Ukrainian-Polish relations have reached a level of strategic partnership and encompass all components of bilateral relations between states.

Cooperation between states has a dynamic character and embraces a wide range of interaction in political, military, economic, cultural, and humanitarian spheres that in many cases are determinant for the future development of Ukraine. Poland plays an important role in Ukraine's progressive movement toward European society and security structures. The role is determined by overlapping national interests in many areas, as well as profound historical and cultural relations. Ukrainian-Polish cooperation includes an intensive high-political dialogue, economic and commercial cooperation on the state, regional and local levels, as well as active military cooperation.

In 1997, Ukraine and Poland signed an Agreement on the formation of a Ukrainian-Polish Joint Peacekeeping Battalion (UKRPOLBAT), which became fully operational in 1999 in the Kosovo Conflict. A Ukrainian unit also has been deployed in Lebanon, as part of the Polish-led UN Interim Force enforcing the mandated ceasefire agreement since July 2000. Both countries take an active part in Operation Iraqi Freedom. A Ukrainian Task Forces had been deployed in Iraqi, as part of the Coalition Forces under Polish command from August 2003 to December 2005. In the framework of cooperation with NATO Ukraine works closely with Poland in the fields of multinational exercises, defense reform execution, and development of joint capabilities. A new regional initiative between Ukraine, Poland and Latvia gave birth to a joint multinational peacekeeping battalion in 2005.

In Ukraine's progress toward the European community Poland plays a considerable role helping promote and structure democratic procedures and develop a model of Ukrainian relations with the EU. Poland is an active promoter of the Ukrainian aspirations toward NATO and the EU. Modern Ukrainian-Polish relations form an axis of peace and stability in the Central-European region, by activating integration processes and encouraging other countries toward cooperation and unification within the European community.

Moldova, the north-western neighbor of Ukraine, occupies an important place in Ukrainian foreign policy. Besides the common border, both countries have close foreign policy priorities, good perspectives for economic cooperation, and ethnic minorities that live in both countries. An essential part in these bilateral relations is occupied by the conflict between Moldova and the unrecognized Transnistrian-Moldovan Republic, which lies on Moldovan territory close to the Ukrainian border. Ukraine is taking an active part in the settlement of the Transnistrian problem.

Ukrainian military observers take part in peacekeeping operations in the conflict region. Ukraine has repeatedly addressed this issue, initiated a high-level political dialogue, and has submitted proposals about the peaceful settlement of the conflict.²⁶

Ukraine's foreign policy toward Romania builds on the development of good-neighboring relations, and is developed on the bilateral level as well as in the frames of regional and international organizations. Relations between the two countries are based on shared strategic goals and a similar vision of a common Europe. These relations include high-level political meetings, and cooperation in the economic, commercial, and cultural areas. Mutual relations had been disturbed by Danube channel issues. However, regional and trans-border cooperation within the Carpathian Euroregion, the Euroregion of Lower Danube and Upper Prut has provided effective mechanisms for a peaceful resolution of outstanding issues. Ukrainian-Romanian relations might serve as an example of a mutually negotiated and peaceful resolution of bilateral claims and a sober approach to preserving harmony and stability in the Central-European region.

Ukraine gives considerable attention to its relations with the Baltic States. Historical, cultural, and ethno-national commonalities and shared strategic goals form a sound basis for fruitful relations. Ukraine particularly appreciates the experience of these states with regard to accession to NATO and the EU, including modernizing political systems, adjusting national legislatures in accordance with European standards, and restructuring of national armed forces according to NATO standards. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia carry out a policy of trust and support toward Ukraine helping it to understand the specifics of the negotiation process with European organizations, and to develop effective mechanisms of cooperation. Considerable assistance is rendered in the military sphere and is focused on the achievement of NATO standards by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and on the development of joint military capabilities. Ukrainian cooperation with the Baltic States, and particularly with Latvia, reached a strategic level of importance.

From the northern borders to the Black Sea coast Ukraine builds its relations with neighboring states on the principles of common respect, trust, and commonality of interests. The main emphasis is on preserving peace and building a *core of stability* in the Central-European region by active participation in European institutions and security organizations, developing effective regional and sub-regional relations, as well as strengthening bilateral relations.

Black Sea Regional Cooperation

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War stimulated radical geopolitical changes in the Black Sea region, “...created instability, weakened nation-states, fostered unhealthy economic competition for hydrocarbon resources and a host of other transnational issues.”²⁷ The regional states have had to face new threats and challenges—terrorism, organized crime, drugs and arms smuggling, human trafficking, illegal migration, corruption—that along with ethnic and religious conflicts in the Caucasus, Yugoslavia, and the Balkans undermine regional security and stability. The region itself has presented “...potential breeding grounds of instability.”²⁸

Ukraine, along with other nation-states in the region engages in transnational cooperation in order to address these threats and challenges. Multinational cooperation fosters initiatives for establishing political, military, and economic relations, and ensuring stability and promoting prosperity all over the region.

Since 1992 Ukraine, along with other states of the region,²⁹ has been participating in *The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation* (BSEC). The BSEC is designed to foster interaction and harmony between states, enhance cooperation for mutually beneficial economic, technological and social progress, “...as well as to ensure peace, stability and prosperity encouraging friendly and good-neighborly relations in the Black Sea region.”³⁰ The BSEC presents a unique opportunity for states that have an unresolved conflict, difficulties in interactions due to ethnic enmity, or problems in their official relations, to work through an open and equal dialogue for conflict resolution.³¹ Cooperation within the BSEC includes different spheres, such as trade and economy, energy and resources, science and technology, transport and communication, environmental protection and disaster relief, banking and finance, as well as international tourism and entertainment. Ukraine participates in different BSEC projects, and considers such participation vital for strengthening the Black Sea regional cooperation.

Ukraine, together with other nations,³² has participated in *the Black Sea Naval Task Group* (BLACKSEAFOR) since 2001. The BLACKSEAFOR is a multinational naval military formation that was created to conduct multinational “...search and rescue operations for humanitarian needs, cleaning sea mines, joint action for protecting the Black Sea environment and organizing good will visits amongst Black Sea countries.”³³ The BLACKSEAFOR offers mechanisms for military-political consultations on a ministerial level, and has dedicated its naval forces for UN-led or OSCE-led peacekeeping activities. Activations of the BLACKSEAFOR are usually conducted twice per year under a flag of one member-nation on a rotational basis.

Cooperation helps to enhance command and control procedures, develop mutual standards of communication and interaction, and achieve interoperability.

Ukraine also participates in *the Black Sea Regional Security Organization* (BSRSO) under the sponsorship of the Marshall Center and the Black Sea Security Program at Harvard University. The BSRSO “...initiates an effort to create a regional sense of commonality by bringing together military and political leaders responsible for security issues from the Black Sea states and Caucasus region.”³⁴ The Black Sea Security Program at Harvard University conducts seminars and informal meetings on an annual basis, thus it offers an open forum for discussion on region-related issues and a breeding ground for initiatives and practical solutions.

All organizations supplement each other and cover a full spectrum of activities between member-states, from theoretical deliberation of important issues to workable solutions and practical cooperation. ‘The trinity’ – BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR, BSRSO – makes a good contribution in preserving peace and stability within the Black Sea region. Ukraine is actively engaged in cooperation that has proven to be helpful in fostering good relations between countries and promoting democratic principles throughout the region. The cooperation ensures a stable and secure atmosphere on Ukraine’s southern borders, and provides momentum for fostering economic prosperity and well-being.

GUUAM

Ukraine initiated the establishment of GUAM —the grouping of four former Soviet republics that later became GUUAM³⁵—in 1997. The group was founded as a political, economic and strategic alliance designed to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of five former Soviet Union republics. The member-nations share similar interests and difficulties, such as a deficit of resources, energy acquisition and conservation issues, nation-building, and development of democratic institutions. While this grouping was perceived by Russia as a threat to its dominant policy in post-Soviet Eurasia (member-states have an intention to become part of the EU and NATO structures and pay little attention to CIS development), the GUUAM Charter, signed during the Yalta 2001 Summit, “...declared that GUUAM would not be transformed into military-political structure and defined deepening of economic relations as the key element of cooperation.”³⁶ Kremlin repeatedly argued that GUUAM works against Russian interests and would potentially compete against the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). The GUUAM officials continuously stated that GUUAM is neither anti-CIS nor anti-Russian, and that cooperation is based on the mutual interests of participating countries. In recent years Russia’s

policy towards GUUAM became more neutral and Putin's administration has tried to make policy more reasonable.³⁷

The GUUAM agenda addresses a wide variety of issues, including economy, energy supplies, commerce and trade, transportation, culture and education, information and telecommunication, tourism, and many others. Economic cooperation in the Black Sea-Caspian region and the establishment of the Trans-Caucasus Transport Corridor (TCTC) are considered as GUUAM's primary goals and an important step to ensure independence, sovereignty, and stability among countries within the region. The TCTC, which links Baku-Tbilisi-Poti-Odessa-Kyiv, has a significant potential for trade and transportation of resources. It provides a zone for trade separate from CIS influence and gives an alternative route for the flow of goods and materials. Future projects include a connection with the Central-European area and utilization of the TCTC for importing oil, natural gas, and goods from Central Asia and the Caucasus to European countries. Taking into account the high dependence of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine on Russian energy resources, GUUAM provides an alternative approach to dealing with this issue.

Besides 'standard peaceful interests' the group deals with new threats and challenges such as terrorism, transnational organized crime, and drug trafficking. GUUAM foresees a mechanism for consultation on security related issues and conflict resolution. Member-nations work together on the bilateral level in the area of military-technical cooperation, but their activities are limited due to the insufficient budget funds. A recent initiative on the creation of a multinational peacekeeping battalion has been made with the aim of protecting pipelines and transportation routes against new asymmetric threats.

The cooperation within the forum is highly important for Ukraine. GUUAM fosters the development of sub-regional cooperation, political and economic contacts in the strategically important area for ensuring stable European and regional security. Together with BSEC it presents a valuable parallel mechanism for resolving regional issues and guaranteeing economic development and democratic transformation. Both organizations have similar agendas which overlap and reinforce each other. It is possible that in the future they will merge together, thus creating a zone of stability from the Middle Asia to the Mediterranean and Europe.

European and Global Security Cooperation

Ukraine's Relations with NATO

Ukraine has declared that its Euro-Atlantic integration and full-fledged membership both in NATO and in the EU are the primary goals of its National Security Policy. Ukraine has a "Distinctive Partnership" and launched an "Intensified Dialogue" with NATO and has been an active participant in Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities. Mutual cooperation has bolstered the Defense Review in the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and spread defense reforms through the entire national security sector. Ukraine currently takes part in NATO's Operation Active Endeavour that is carried on against suspected terrorist activities in the Mediterranean. Soon, Ukraine is going to join the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), and is looking forward to deepening its relationship with the EU.

The history of the Ukraine-NATO relationship started in February 1994 when Ukraine, first among the CIS countries, joined the NATO PfP Program. Soon after, in 1995, the first Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent, as a part of the NATO-led IFOR, was sent to Bosnia, where a Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent had previously served under the UN banner during the Yugoslav civil wars. Since that time more than 24,000 Ukrainian military personnel and civilians have taken part in international peacekeeping activities around the world. Currently Ukraine is represented by 1,700 troops in twelve peacekeeping missions. Ukraine offered its biggest training center "Yavoriv" for international PfP exercises and practical activities. The Multinational Staff Officers Course in Kyiv provides peacekeeping training and education. In 1997 NATO opened a NATO Information and Documentation Center in Kyiv and NATO Liaison Office in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) the first on the territory of the former Soviet Union. In turn, Ukraine established the Mission of Ukraine to NATO's Alliance Headquarters in Brussels and sent its representatives to NATO's regional command headquarters in Mons, Naples, and Norfolk. The Embassy of the Polish Republic had been chosen as the NATO Contact Embassy in Ukraine to support bilateral cooperation.

The "Charter on Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine" was signed at the Madrid Summit in July 1997. The Charter became a pivotal point in NATO-Ukraine relations and raised them to a qualitatively new level. It lays down fundamentals for new forms of political-military relations and practical cooperation. Based on Chapter regulations NATO formally recognized the importance of its relations with Ukraine by establishing the NATO-Ukraine Commission – the main political consultation mechanism that among PfP countries exists only for Russia and Ukraine. The Charter also made possible the

creation of other mechanisms for bilateral cooperation, including the NATO-Ukraine Military Committee, Joint Working Group on Defense Reform, Joint Group on Civil Emergency Planning, and Joint Working Group on Armament. Ukraine and NATO have held consultations and carried out practical cooperation in the field of defense and security sector reforms, civil-military relations and democratic control, defense planning, and on achieving interoperability. A number of pilot projects that are dedicated to the future structure of UAF development, professionalization of UAF, language training, etc., are underway.

To support Ukraine's aspirations toward NATO, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan (AP), which is very similar to the MAP, was adopted in November 2002. The AP identifies Ukraine's strategic priorities and objectives in pursuit of its aspirations towards full integration into the Euro-Atlantic security structures. The AP is a mid-term planning document that sets benchmarks for political, economic, social, and military transformations. For annual planning and evaluation of related progress the Annual Target Plans (ATP) is to be developed, including specific implementation measures for Ukrainian and NATO-Ukraine joint actions. Another document—the NATO-Ukraine Individual Partnership Program (IPP)—is designated to educate Ukrainian military men and MoD civilians about NATO's role, missions, standards, and procedures. Annually the IPP sponsors roughly 300 activities, plus about 50 unplanned events. Priorities are placed on staff procedures, language training, logistics, military education and exercises, standardization, and interoperability. Events regularly include PfP exercises, professional and language courses, seminars, working visits and consultations. Since 1995 the UAF have been taking part in the Planning and Review Process (PARP), the mechanism that provides defense planning and budget assessment, and serves as a tool of transparency in NATO-Ukraine relations. PARP also offers procedures for combat capabilities development and allows evaluation of readiness level of units and assets declared for NATO-led exercises and operations. Sixteen units and related assets were declared for PARP activities in 2005, including an airborne brigade, infantry and engineering battalions, a company of marines, heavy cargo aircraft flight, a helicopter squadron, and several warships and support vessels, etc.

The NATO-Ukraine cooperation is organized according to common legislation. Over the last years Ukraine and NATO signed several memoranda of understanding (MOUs), including the Memorandum on Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness, on NATO Liaison Officers, on Host Nation Support, on Logistic Support Cooperation as well as the Implementing Arrangement for the Destruction of Anti-personnel Landmines, Agreement on Retraining of Discharged or Retired Military Personnel, and others. All those documents, along with the

Charter on Distinctive Partnership, institute the legal basis of Ukrainian cooperation with the NATO Alliance.

At the NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting of foreign ministers in April 2005, the Allies and Ukraine launched an Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine's aspirations to obtain NATO membership and announced a package of short-term actions designed to enhance NATO-Ukraine cooperation in high-priority reform areas. In June 2005 Ukraine made its first concrete step on Intensified Dialogue with NATO. The Ukrainian government formally presented the discussion paper that addresses key issues set out in the 1995 Study on Enlargement -- such as domestic and foreign policy, defense and security sector reform, as well as legal and security issues-- and includes questions regarding the implications of NATO membership. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said during the Informal High-Level Consultations in Vilnius, 23-24 October 2005; "The picture is clear: Ukrainian authorities are very serious about their membership aspirations, NATO reaffirms its open door policy and intends to offer maximum help".

It is obvious that the Ukraine-NATO partnership is an important mechanism for promoting the involvement of Ukraine in all-European integration processes. NATO continues to support the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, its territorial integrity, the principle of inviolability of frontiers, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state as key factors for ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and the continent as a whole. NATO has also recognized and supports the Ukraine's strategic course of integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. However future movement toward NATO and a question of joining the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) solely depend on intensified processes of economic reforms, reforms in the field of security and defense, resolution of social problems, and the strengthening of democratic institutions in Ukraine.

U.S.-Ukraine Relations

Official U.S.-Ukraine relations started with the opening of the US Diplomatic mission to Ukraine in Kiev on January 22, 1992. In 1993 the two countries signed the Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation. "In the beginning, there were significant differences in political, security and even bureaucratic cultures between two countries, which formed obstacles to building bridges quickly."³⁸ But the young country was desperately seeking support for its independence and sovereignty. Ukraine also needed to strengthen its relations with western democracies in order to counterbalance Russia. Security cooperation with the U.S.

demonstrated that Ukraine was important for U.S. interests and how the U.S. has helped Ukraine's assertion of sovereignty.

Ukraine's successful integration and consolidation as a democratic country are important to U.S. national interests and require a strong and sustained strategy. Ukraine is a key European country with geopolitical importance in Europe, the Black Sea region, and the Caucasus. Its economy is more diversified than many in the post-Communist region, with potential in the energy, defense, scientific-technological, manufacturing, and agricultural sectors. Security and prosperity in Ukraine will prove that a promising post-Communist future is possible also for Russia itself.³⁹

According to Morgese, U.S.-Ukraine security cooperation in 1993-2001 was determined by two key events: (1) the de-nuclearization of Ukraine, and (2) the de-sovietization of the UAF.⁴⁰ The first objective, the de-nuclearization of Ukraine, had been fully achieved by September 2002. In accordance with the numerous bilateral (Ukraine and U.S.) and trilateral (Russia, Ukraine, and U.S.) agreements and protocols Ukraine removed more than 1,272 nuclear warheads and transferred them to Russia by June 1996. By October 2001, all means of nuclear weapons delivery system, including 130 ?? -18 (SS-19), 44 ?? -22 (SS-24) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and 46 strategic bombers (19 Tupolev ?u-160, 25 ?u-95? ?),⁴¹ had been completely destroyed, 13 tons of rocket fuel had been disposed of in an environmentally safe manner, 17 command posts, and 173 ICBM silos were destroyed and completely leveled. The last condition of the de-nuclearization program was fulfilled by September 2002, when the Ukrainian 43rd Rocket Army located in Pervomaisk ceased to exist. The second objective of Ukrainian-U.S. cooperation—the de-sovietization of the UAF—is partly achieved. Ukraine was able to transform a mass grouping of forces inherited from the Soviet Union into its national Armed Forces. The main components of command and control, such as the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff were created. The UAF were reshaped by establishing functional components and territorial commands, and sufficient reduction of the UAF manpower strength has been accomplished.

Undoubtedly, the biggest achievement of U.S.-Ukraine security cooperation in this period is that Ukraine became a member of a peacekeeping community. Ukraine has been engaged in peacekeeping activities since 1992 and today its peacekeepers are deployed in Lebanon, Sierra-Leone, Georgia, Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia, and in the Transdnestrian region of the Moldova Republic. In 1994 Ukraine joined the PfP Program. The "Yavoriv" training center was opened for peacekeeping practical training and multinational exercises in 1999. In order to assist in planning and executing PfP exercises, such as Peace Shield and Sea Breeze, the California – Ukraine State Partnership Program was designed. The Program engaged

representatives from the U.S. California National Guard for consultation and for the provision of expert assistance in carrying out PfP exercises. Another value of mutual cooperation is the personal relations between individual Ukrainian and U.S. military representatives, especially from the U.S. Strategic Command in Europe (EUCOM) and the U.S. California National Guard. These strong relations provide a solid background for interaction in the field of security cooperation, the GWOT, and peacekeeping.

Soon after September 11, 2001 Ukraine joined the antiterrorist coalition. Ukraine joined the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Terrorism in 2001, and ratified the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in 2002. Showing its strong support for counter-terrorist activities and the GWOT, Ukraine provided over flight privileges to the U.S. Air Forces, sent its representatives to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Coalition Coordination Center, established the interchange of information about terrorist activities, and contributed its peacekeeping contingent to the Coalition forces in Iraq. The Ukrainian brigade arrived in Iraq in August 2003 as a part of the Polish-led regional command and took over control the province of Wasit. In their daily routine Ukrainians provided security and stability within the region, helped the local authorities and provided assistance to the indigenous population. Ukrainian coalition forces built schools and hospitals, repaired water supplies and sewerage, and reestablished power lines and communication systems. The Ukrainian contingent transferred its security mission to an Iraqi brigade and left Iraq by December 2005 while some 50 personnel stayed in Iraq and have continued with their training and expert assistance duties with Iraqi forces.

Today U.S.-Ukraine security cooperation is continuing in such areas as cooperation in fighting terrorism and counter-proliferation of WMD. But the most robust cooperation with the U.S. is in the defense reform sector. It comprises a number of bilateral projects and activities in such fields as professionalization, modernization, and the creation of a functional component of the UAF – the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF). The U.S.-Ukraine bilateral cooperation program calls for assistance in this area. The main goal of the program is to create two JRRF brigades fully interoperable with NATO forces by 2012⁴². It includes professional, as well as language training for NCOs and officers, assistance in transforming the headquarters and brigade structures to NATO standards, helps in doctrine development, and with the procurement of tactical surveillance and communications equipment. Most of these activities are conducted under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs. It is expected that for the FY 2006 Ukraine will get considerable

financial assistance—one of the five biggest among European and Eurasian countries—under IMET and FMF programs.⁴³

The U.S. works together with Ukraine helping to create a professional Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps, develop leadership, establish civil-military affairs institutions in UAF, and achieve operational interoperability. The U.S. provides considerable assistance in modernizing Ukrainian national military training installations and facilities . The U.S. has invested funds in the development of the Ukrainian PfP Training Center “Yavoriv”, the Multinational Staff Officers Course, the Simulation Center at the National Defense Academy of Ukraine, as well as in the installation of eight language laboratories in military educational institutions. The U.S. assists Ukraine in the acquisition of military equipment—predominantly for units declared for NATO-led operations and peacekeeping activities, and JRRF units—and training in accordance with western military standards.

The Ukrainian Parliament stated in the Declaration of Independence in 1991 that Ukraine holds to three non-nuclear principles: (1) not develop; (2) not produce; and (3) not acquire nuclear weapons. Ukraine proved its non-nuclear status by voluntarily eliminating nuclear weapons and remains faithful to its obligations on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and of related technologies. Ukraine continues to respect its obligations on the non-proliferation of WMD, and actively cooperates with the U.S. and NATO in WMD non-proliferation activities. Ukraine takes part in the Proliferation Security Initiative that has been introduced by the U.S., and the Australian Group. Ukraine does not possess and does not produce chemical and biological weapons or their components, and actively supports their non-proliferation and the associated UN Convention. Ukraine works together with the Defense Threat Reduction Office (DTRO) on the implementation of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and arms control treaty inspections and monitoring in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” has given a fresh impetus to U.S.-Ukraine relations and boosted further cooperation since the end of 2004. Marking the first anniversary of the “Orange Revolution” in Washington on November 22, 2005, President Bush said:

The United States will continue to support the efforts of President Viktor Yushchenko in advancing a democratic, prosperous, and secure Ukraine, and America is proud to call Ukraine a friend.

The Ukrainian movement to the standards of Western democracies must begin with its reforms at home. In order to create the impetus for policy and law improvements, generate reforms in security and defense sectors, and attract foreign investment the U.S. will challenge

Ukraine's leaders and citizens to develop a European democracy and market economy, while creating opportunity to remove outdated obstacles to progress.⁴⁴ As a first step, the U.S. should abrogate the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 which is an outdated vestige of the Cold War. Further, the initiation of a Free Trade Agreement between the two countries and the U.S. recognition of Ukraine as a market economy country will result in Ukraine's accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO). All these measures will move Ukraine close to Western markets, boost Ukraine's economic growth, and strengthen overall stability in the Central and Eastern European region.

The U.S. is interested in the development of a stable and constructive Ukrainian relationship with Russia, based on free trade and economic cooperation, consistent with Ukraine's eventual integration into the EU.⁴⁵ The U.S. is also going to play a leading role in the transformation and integration of Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community and assist Ukraine with the fulfillment of its NATO membership requirements.⁴⁶

It is imperatively important that Ukraine continues to maintain its pace and strategic course on achieving Western standards of democracy. Security cooperation with the U.S. will support this goal and help to achieve a true military transformation, Ukraine's integration in North-Atlantic and European security structures, and the promotion of stability in the Central and Eastern European region.

Conclusion

Ukraine finds itself at a critical point in its history. Although Ukraine's current orientation is firmly placed towards its integration in the NATO and the EU Euro-Atlantic political and security structures, Ukraine's national security interests and policy must navigate the inherent tensions that exist between the U.S.-dominated NATO Alliance and neighboring Russia. Ukrainian national security interests cannot simply be defined within the narrow framework of U.S. concepts of "containment," i.e., the formation of geopolitical "strategic barriers" against "hostile" nation-states, nor can Ukraine afford or accept the traditional Russian geostrategic dominance of a "satellite state" by another name.

If Ukraine was to simply play the role of a NATO "barrier" state in a "containment" of Russian geostrategic influence, then Ukraine will face the corresponding national security risks that would include significant domestic political and economic challenges. Thus, it appears that Ukraine's geopolitical commitment to the Euro-Atlantic political and security structures cannot be implemented unilaterally and without the implementation of corresponding political and economic commitments from the West. To proceed in this course engenders severe domestic

political and economic risks. Ukraine cannot modernize its economy by simply restructuring it along Western market-driven principles and receiving International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD) loans, but without concrete capital investment from Western private enterprises that will have a measurably positive effect for the employment and well-being of the Ukrainian population. In short, the pain of Ukraine's economic and political structural reforms must be shared by the undertaking and sharing of risks by Ukraine's Western political partners.

It should be noted that the average per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in Ukraine is \$1,324.⁴⁷ Thus, it can be readily observed that although Ukraine is industrially advanced, its per capita economic wealth is not dissimilar to that of certain underdeveloped economies of the Third World. These economic conditions create inherent risks of domestic political instability that can be readily exploited by outside forces. The "Orange Revolution" in 2004 that instituted a radical political change for Ukraine was fortunately carried out in a way that did not affect the fundamental unity of the country. However, the unity of the country was endangered and was preserved because of a number of factors, e.g., the UAF and the domestic security forces maintained their professionalism and did not choose political sides during the "Orange Revolution."⁴⁸

In view of the domestic socioeconomic and political challenges that Ukraine faces, its national security policy must follow the path of a delicate balance between the interaction of Western and Russian interests. More time will be required to adjust the national bureaucratic culture, and legislative, economic, and market structures to Western standards. Consistent efforts and patience will be needed to solve issues such as the diversification of energy supplies and final demarcation of national borders. The Ukrainian government should maintain stable, constructive, and positive relations with Russia. Ukraine should continue its participation in regional and sub-regional security and economic organizations, such as GUUAM, BSEC and BLACKSEAFOR. The recent accession of Ukraine into the Visegrad Group demonstrates the importance of cooperation with the new European democratic states. Ukraine should be engaged in the whole spectrum of European security and economic organizations, and continue to develop strong political ties with EU countries. Ukrainian national security policy should continue to support the GWOT and contribute to anti-terrorist and peacekeeping activities. On its way to NATO Ukraine should focus on both U.S.-Ukrainian bilateral and U.S.-Ukrainian-Polish trilateral cooperation. Ukraine should develop persuasive public diplomacy and craft an intensified public information campaign on the benefits of EU and NATO-membership. All these priorities should be covered by the new National Security Strategy.

Development and gradual implementation of Ukraine's National Security Strategy is one of today's urgent challenges, since the Strategy does not exist as a concise document, but is rather presented as a collection of different constitutional proclamations and legislative acts. The new Security Strategy has to clearly specify national values, which should be based on universal human values, such as basic human rights and freedoms; human well-being; prosperity of the state; and territorial integrity and sovereignty. It has to prioritize national interests oriented toward building a free democratic state, a prosperous civil society, and a market-driven economy that will continue to have appropriate "social safety net" safeguards. The Security Strategy needs to clearly examine the structure of threats and challenges to the state's national interests for the coming decades, and provide a clear-cut formulation of strategic goals and political priorities in all vital areas of national security. It has to detail main reference points for future prospects in internal and external policies, and indicate directions and implementation mechanisms for the achievement of national interests. The Strategy has to address the issue of a national security sector reform, and specify goals and tasks for the transformation of all elements of national military power, as well as law enforcement agencies. Finally, the Strategy has to present a desirable model of the future, must have an active character, and be directed toward the achievement of long-term strategic goals.

Endnotes

¹ Serhiy P. Holovaty, "Ukraine at the Crossroads: Perspectives on Independence, Democracy, and Reform," available from <http://www.trilateral.org/annmtgs/trialog/trlgtxts/t53/hol.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 November 2005.

² In January 1992 Ukraine became a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in July 1992 Ukraine send its first peacekeeping contingents under UN flag in the Balkans and in Kosovo (?????-UNPROFOR), in February 1994 Ukraine joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program, it was among the first of the former Soviet republics to do so, in November 1995 became a member of the Council of Europe, The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO signed in July 1997.

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²⁷ Harvard Black Sea Security Program News, "Marshall Center Conference on Black Sea Regional Security – Munich, 06-08 December 2004," available from <http://harvard-bssp.org/news>; Internet; accessed 29 November 2005.

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³⁵ Cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine started with the GUAM consultative forum, established during the Council of Europe summit in Strasbourg in October 1997, and named after the initial letters of each of those countries. In April 1999 Uzbekistan joined the group changing the name into GUUAM.

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⁴⁷ *Background Note: Ukraine*, available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3211.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 January 2006.

⁴⁸ BBC News, “How Ukraine ‘verged on civil war’,” 22 November 2005; available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/h/europe/4459876.stm> ; Internet; accessed 1 January 2006. During the “Orange Revolution” an understanding was reached between the then anti-government demonstrators and the security forces that no government buildings would be seized. This understanding was reached with the involvement of foreign ambassadors. The security forces refrained from aggressively attacking the demonstrators.